As Canada's ongoing warship replacement program lurches towards an untidy outcome that will likely satisfy few except perhaps corporate lawyers, the United States Navy (USN) is undergoing an equally difficult evolution with its Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).  On 10 July 2017, the USN indicated its intent to explore options for a new, more capable frigate design, provisionally described as the FFG(X) – Fast Frigate, Guided Missile (Experimental).  This move signals the possible abandonment of LCS development: a significant change in direction for that troubled program, and one with interesting implications for Canada.The original goal of the LCS program was to develop a reasonably capable, highly cost-effective “small surface combatant.” This was to be a fast, technologically advanced, approximately corvette-sized vessel, capable of operating with a reduced crew.  To allow the ship to be purchased in the numbers required to support expanded operations in the Pacific and Gulf theatres, and sustained in a challenging manpower and fiscal environment, expensive high-end warfighting capabilities such as advanced anti-air warfare and ballistic missile defence sensors and weapons were deleted.  Instead, more modest “mission kits” would provide mine countermeasure, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare capabilities.  The kits were to be shared among ships, in “plug and play” modules that would be temporarily installed or removed according to deployment requirements.To foster competition and reduce overall program risk, two competing warship designs were chosen for limited production.  The goal was to competitively incentivize the shipbuilders to innovate to reduce costs and maximize capability, within the constraints of a commercially viable (albeit short) production run.  Although the reduced warfighting capabilities of the LCS concept were controversial from the outset, it was felt that the limitations inherent to a smaller, more lightly armed combatant could be prudently offset with smart design features, advanced automation, speed advantages, and the ability to operate in shallower waters.  Behind the qualitative rhetoric, however, loomed the fact that without reducing individual ship costs and manpower requirements, the USN would have little chance of achieving the target hull numbers of the mandated 355-ship Navy within their anticipated budget.  Faced with this incontrovertible reality, the senior leadership of the USN did what they needed to do: they got on with building and crewing the two LCS variants, while working through the inevitable teething problems of any new design.Unfortunately, as the competing vessels progressed through trials and entered active service, it became increasingly clear that even the modest capability goals for the class would be difficult to achieve within the desired cost.  Against a backdrop of frequent, high-profile mechanical failures, questions regarding the vessels' survivability and the wisdom of spending so much to achieve so little at-sea capability began to mount.  In 2010, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation at the Pentagon reported that neither of the two designs was expected to survive a hostile combat environment.  By 2012, the Secretary of the Navy acknowledged that the LCS would require the protection of other warships when operating in combat areas – thereby nullifying the argument that a smaller, lower-cost ship could be deployed more widely.  In 2014, with eight ships already in active service, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) reported that operating costs were considerably more than a conventional multi-purpose frigate of greater capabilities, built to full Naval survivability standards; a particularly problematic finding, given the extent to which acquisition costs had grown.By 2015, the decision was taken to reduce the total LCS buy from 52 to 40. Within the USN, plans were being drawn up for significant structural, sensor, and weapons additions that would push the cost and weight of the remaining ships far beyond what was originally envisaged.  This considerably complicated the process of choosing which of the very different LCS designs to pursue.  As noted by the GAO in 2016, the acquisition strategy for the class had already morphed from “fly before you buy” into a bulk purchase of two, equally unproven streams of vessels.  Down-selecting to a single variant that would then be extensively modified into a completely different, third class of ship – which might inherit many of the design limitations of its predecessor – was never the original intent of the evaluation process, and raised the risk of settling on a design that was just as unsuitable as the first two.Consequently, in announcing its intent to pursue an FFG(X) procurement, the USN is sending a very clear signal: for the first time since the retirement of the Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigate (the last of which was commissioned in 1989), it intends to explore clean-sheet options for getting back into the multi-purpose frigate game.This represents an unusual and exciting opportunity for Canada, particularly given the current state of the Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) procurement.While it might be comforting to believe that the CSC program is basically on track and moving briskly to build and introduce a world-class multi-purpose frigate to the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), in the numbers and at the cost projected, few informed observers would agree that this is the case.  Even after years of work to ameliorate the program, and on the cusp of the first bids being submitted in mid-August, the impenetrable complexity of the process, ongoing industry wrangling, and ever-expanding price tag all suggest that staying the current course seems most likely to deliver less capability than the RCN needs, later than it is needed, and at a cost that will ultimately prove shocking to Canadian taxpayers.It has been suggested that the sign of a good compromise is one which dissatisfies all participants equally, but this is surely a poor metric for success for a multi-billion dollar weapon system which will be in service for decades, is intended to remake the face of Canadian Naval industry, and which will carry Canada's sailors into harm's way in service of the country.  Instead, would it not be better to leverage the considerable competencies of our most important economic and military ally, share our valuable operational and design knowledge in an area where we have world-class industry, and explore the possibility of collaborating to solve a common problem?If the Government, procurement officials, the RCN, and Canadian industry can work together with a sense of urgency and boldness to formulate, propose, and ultimately execute on a collaborative Bi-National Frigate Strategy with the United States, it could lead to an elegant, win-win outcome that resets two highly problematic programs, in a manner that would greatly benefit both countries, their respective Navies, and industry as well.In considering such an approach, the initial step is to quickly establish whether there is sufficient alignment between the operational needs of the two Navies to make a joint program feasible.Fortunately, Canada has already produced a very solid CSC requirements document, which includes extensive technical specifications based on decades of multi-purpose frigate operations.  This could form an immediate starting point for a foundational capability discussion with the USN.  While the CSC mission set is not an exact analogue, there is significant overlap between it and many of the systems, sensors, weapons, and warfighting capabilities needed in the FFG(X).  Like Canada, the USN needs a survivable, multi-role vessel that has the equipment, speed, range, and seakeeping ability to operate independently in hostile waters, and work in concert with other nations.  It requires advanced anti-submarine and electronic warfare capabilities, and a highly capable long-range radar system able to direct modern air to surface missiles in self-protection, area air defence, and perhaps even theatre ballistic missile defence roles.  It needs a conventional naval gun, smaller systems for close-in self-defence, and the ability to operate a medium-sized maritime helicopter in parallel with a range of airborne, surface, and possibly subsurface autonomous vehicles.  Finally, it requires an advanced suite of integrated combat management and automated ship control systems, to enable high-end warfighting operations and battle-damage tolerance, even with a reduced crew footprint.On a purely military level, a harmonized requirements set has much to recommend it.  Although the two Navies train and operate differently, a strong baseline of procedural interoperability already exists, and would only be reinforced by commonality of equipment.  Canada could benefit from US advances in platform-level cyber protection, and would gain easier access to an expanded range of operational capabilities that might otherwise be unachievable due to CSC cost and technical obstacles. For its part, the USN would have a unique avenue to draw upon Canadian key industrial competencies already proven in the Halifax-class frigate, and under active development in anticipation of CSC.  These might include anti-submarine warfare sensors and processing, advanced sensor and system integration approaches, novel schemes for on-board automation, shipboard helicopter integration, and operation of unmanned air, surface, and sub-surface vehicles from medium-sized vessels.Such collaboration would reduce manufacturing and technical risk not only in the design and build phases, but also as the complex weapon system is sustained over its lifetime.  The powerful “user group” advantage can already be seen in programs such as the F/A-18 Hornet fighter, the C-130 Hercules, and the C-17 Globemaster transport aircraft, in which the US, Canada, and other users share platform information and leverage each-other's developmental efforts – an approach that would be equally applicable to a common pattern frigate.Of course, military to military discussions are only a part of exploring the viability of a truly Bi-National program.  Once the operational feasibility has been verified, Canada would also need to engage formal discussions at Government, procurement staff, and industry levels, to ensure common ground could be established around National industrial expectations, procurement processes and timelines, and general manufacturing strategies.This would not be a small undertaking, but if alignment were possible, it could dramatically enhance both the cost-effectiveness as well as the industrial attractiveness of the CSC program.  Already, some observers have suggested that a change in direction on LCS might cause CSC bidders to shift their focus to the more lucrative USN market.  Given the greater predictability of the US procurement processes, less onerous intellectual property (IP) requirements, and a more conventional distribution of labour between warship designers, system integrators, and shipyards, the possibility that major industrial players might reconsider their commitment to submit CSC bids is a real danger.  At the very least, a significantly reduced number of bidders could damage the quality of CSC competition, result in fewer options for Canada, and potentially create new cost and quality pressures on the program.With a larger Bi-National program, however, the increased number of ships (at least 20 for the USN, and a further 12-15 ships for the RCN) will likely result in mutual cost and capability benefits due to the increased scale of manufacture, and greater scope for industry to recoup its investments over the service life of the fleet.  Such an overture could also represent an important evolutionary milestone for the Canada-US Defence Production Sharing Agreement (DPSA).  At a time when the new US administration has signalled it wishes “more than a tweak…, but less than a do-over” of NAFTA (in the words of Sarah Goldfeder of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute), this may emerge as a particularly valuable political and trade outcome, and a reminder of the vitality and mutual benefits both countries enjoy as a result of this unique cooperative arrangement.Of course, a change in direction of this magnitude comes with other significant challenges.  For example, the current CSC approach would need to be held in abeyance, and elements of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (NSPS) might need to be adjusted.  Canada would likely have to modify its current intentions with respect to owning and managing IP – although this may be a positive development, given the extent to which this issue is already a bone of contention among current CSC competitors.  The role of Irving as both prime contractor and shipbuilder would also need to be renegotiated, as a Bi-National approach would logically seek a similar production strategy for both US and Canadian shipyards, to limit costs.  While daunting to consider, if properly handled this could just as easily open up previously unimaginable industrial advantages for Canadian industry players of all sizes, while reducing risk and enhancing opportunities for smarter division of labour between participating shipyards, and military suppliers.Prudence suggests the Crown would also need to consider reimbursing current CSC bidders for expenses incurred in preparing their submissions – if only to forestall industry anger and legal recourse, and to prevent another black mark on Canada's much-maligned military procurement process.  While this might seem unnecessary, in the context of cost and risk-avoidance around a multi-billion dollar procurement, such an approach would go a long way to restoring bidder confidence and engaging full industry participation in and support for a revised Bi-National approach.Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, competitive selection criteria intended to favour Canadian industry participation (such as the use of Industrial Technological Benefits) would have to be reformulated to accord with a new, Bi-National procurement strategy.  Even in this contentious area, an alternative blueprint exists.  One option might be a variation on the industrial partnership program that is currently providing designated Canadian firms with preferential access to opportunities within the F-35 international community.  Regardless of one's perspective on the merits of that particular aircraft, paying a premium to establish Canadian industrial presence in a multi-national program represents a sound investment, and has had the effect of turning domestic industrial necessity into a political and fiscal virtue.Though proposing such a change to the CSC program might seem radical, it must be remembered that little if any of the truly meaningful progress already made towards Canada's next frigate need be sacrificed.  The requirements will stay largely the same, as will the systems and equipment competitively proposed to satisfy them.  Facilities constructed will still be used; the worst case scenario would be that the ships are still assembled where and how originally intended, in the original numbers - although better approaches (such as a split run to build and fit out the frigates in different locations) may be commercially advantageous.  Canadian jobs in Canadian industry would still be supported.  Even the timeline seems unlikely to suffer; given the USN's aggressive goal of laying its first keel by 2020, aligning CSC and FFG(X) would see the first units being delivered in the mid-2020s, which accords with the most optimistic projections for the current Canadian program.What would change, however, would be the net positive impact of a major increase in the total number of ships to be built under a Bi-National strategy.  This would be a game-changer, providing expanded opportunities across the board, allowing industry to look beyond the relatively limited horizons of each countries' individual program, to instead build cost and profit strategies that address a larger, more sustainable full fleet market as opposed to smaller runs of custom platforms.Canada has a vital, innovative, and dynamic defence manufacturing sector with world-class, cost-competitive technologies in several key areas.  The RCN is a frigate Navy; it currently operates a freshly-modernized, highly capable platform that already embodies many of the qualities sought in an FFG(X).  Better still, it has a viable specification for a replacement well in hand, and ready to share with its closest ally.For it's part, the United States has an extremely capable and experienced military shipbuilding sector, access to cutting-edge technologies, and the industrial clout to drive efficiencies into a shipbuilding program that far outstrip those available in the context of smaller Canadian programs.  Furthermore, the USN is a global power-projection Navy, with theatre experience and logistic support capabilities that it is willing and ready to share with its closest allies, particularly when they bring complementary capabilities into bilateral and multinational operations.We want to build our next great frigate, preferably without bankrupting ourselves in the process. The USN wants to get back into the frigate game, sooner rather than later.  And responsible industry on either side of the border, as well as internationally, wants clear requirements, decent margins, and a predictable competitive environment in which to do business.The FFG(X) Request for Information therefore represents a unique chance for Canada to identify and propose an innovative, low-risk way for the RCN and USN to reset and mutually support each other's warship procurement efforts, in the form of a Bi-National Frigate Strategy.  It is my sincere hope that such discussions are already under way.Jeff Tasseron is a Naval Aviator and the former Commanding Officer of 423 Maritime Helicopter Squadron.  His 26-year career in the Canadian Forces included more than 15 years of operational flying in the Sea King helicopter community, numerous deployments, and staff roles as the Special Advisor to the Chief of Defence Staff (General Walt Natynczyk) and the Director of Joint C4ISR in Chief of Force Development.  Following his retirement, he worked in the Air & Naval business unit of General Dynamics Mission Systems Canada, among other defence industry positions.  He currently provides independent consulting services on a wide range of defence and security issues, including procurement, the function of the civil /military interface,  and industry positioning and strategy.  As he is genetically incapable of confining his prose to 140 character run-on sentences , his first blog can be found at https://avernica.wordpress.com/ - proving that even a retired RCAF Colonel can learn new tricks.  When not working or writing, he can be found playing squash.