Canada is rediscovering that it is part of the “transatlantic”—a geeky term policy analysts use for Europe-North America relations. Indeed, a mutual dynamic that benefits players on both continents was significantly advanced by this week’s NATO summit and related events.
The strategic drift of the Trudeau years was (hopefully) the nadir of Canadian inconsequence on the world stage. The prejudice that we were too small and weak to take a lead on questions of hard international security was always a conceit in the false clothes of humility. That period, thankfully, appears to be ending.
There is reason to feel confident from the events of the last week in Europe. Canada signed a full-spectrum defence and security deal with the EU. The agreement embraces a modern conception that security does not flow solely from military power, but from the collective orientation of all of a state’s assets—including the academy, civil society, business, energy, and technology. Well-deployed, these aspects augment—not duplicate—NATO’s work. The new deal was signed in addition to Canada agreeing to spend 5 per cent of its GDP on military and defence-related infrastructure at the NATO summit.
Why would Canada be of interest to Europe? Besides not being the United States—a non-trivial asset at the moment—consider Canada’s size. As a country of nearly 42 million inhabitants—eighth largest in NATO—and world’s 10th largest economy, it inevitably stands out. A Canada spending 5 per cent of its GDP on defence and loaded with natural resources will be a formidable power in its own right, with an evident value proposition to others. European leaders have not missed this realization.
The value flows both ways: two dynamics mean transatlantic security is no longer just about Canada defending Europe.
First, there is the rise of the EU as a security and defence power. If Canada’s population and economy are attractive, consider the EU at almost 450 million inhabitants and constituting nearly 15 per cent of global GDP. Europe’s already global economic influence combines for a potent mix.
In Canada, stereotypes of European weakness and fecklessness are hard to shake—but outdated. Consider Poland, the Nordic countries, and the Baltic States which are leading the way in comprehensive readiness. The past is unlikely to be a good guide to the future now that most of the continent is spending 5 per cent on defence—if political minds get focussed. The prospect of France, the U.K., and—most consequentially—Germany re-investing in their militaries will be to produce a defence industrial sector Canada cannot ignore. We have deep connections with these countries and should build security with them.
Moreover, what were once mostly French notions of European “strategic autonomy”—basically, the idea Europe should be better able to act independently—are getting a more serious look. That’s driven by U.S. strategic re-orientation, political interference, and economic protectionism. An unintended consequence of the Trump administration’s push for more European defence expenditure is almost certain to be a more assertive Europe with more leverage to back itself up. Canada can either watch to see what happens, or actively position itself alongside these likely developments.
The second factor is that Europe is reversing the flow of security towards North America. From its inception, NATO was about Canada and the U.S. sending troop to Europe to hold the Soviet Union at bay. Russia’s presence on European borders means that’s still the primary mission. However, it is no longer the full story.
The Arctic is part of the reason why. Looking at the world top-down from the North Pole shows why Canada is an essential part of dealing with an unpredictable Russia on the northern flank.
Canada’s “ICE Pact” agreement with the U.S. and Finland—a trilateral agreement for enhancing Arctic icebreaking capabilities—served a reminder that Canada is an element of transatlantic relations. It also demonstrates how Finnish know-how could protect North America. There was further evidence of that this week, as Denmark signed a letter of intent with Canada, Norway, and Germany on maritime security, again with a suggested Arctic angle. It is no longer clear—especially as the U.S. refocuses its attention towards China—that the European quotient in Canadian defence and security is all take and no give.
Much work remains to be done. The next steps Canada should look at are how cooperation between NORAD and NORDEFCO—a cooperation arrangement among all the Nordic countries—can better protect our collective northern flank in the Arctic. Canada should give serious consideration to Sweden’s Gripen or France’s Rafale as the RCAF’s second fighter jet alongside the F-35s.
On the civilian front, we need to work more together on countering hybrid warfare and foreign information manipulation. Furthermore, we must emphasize that Canada is the solution to a serious geopolitical risk faced by the EU: its dependence on liquified natural gas from Russia and the Middle East. That’s why courting European investments in bringing Canadian LNG to consumers is imperative.
But what about the United States as Canada’s number one partner? Think laterally. Resetting those security and economic relations with the U.S. travels in part through Europe—because leverage counts for a lot with American President Donald Trump. Canada needs to cultivate relations with the rest of the world to get that leverage.
Canada needs to rediscover that, ultimately, the defence of our interests is our own, and we’ll work with any responsible international actor to advance them. That’s best done with the United States. And close partnership with Europe is one way of reminding Washington.
Alexander Dalziel had held analyst and executive positions with the Privy Council Office, the Canada School of Public Service, the Department of National Defence, and the Canada Border Services Agency. He is a senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.