Criminal and state-linked actors are systematically exploiting our legal and jurisdictional seams, knowing our enforcement and judicial systems are slow, siloed, and overly constrained by rights infringement fears. These actors operate in the holes of our regulatory gaps.

Some recent steps taken by the federal government—Bill C-2, the Strong Borders Act, and a $1.3-billion border plan—were welcome. But these only scratch the surface of what’s required to defend Canada after decades of neglect in public safety and national security.

And Ottawa’s latest move is a step in the wrong direction, as it waters down C-2 with an even weaker Bill C-12. The latest proposed law contains some measures from C-2 that the government hopes to move through Parliament more expediently, while also still pursuing the first bill. But the rollback reveals the gap between public understanding and the serious threats we face.

C-2 and C-12: bridges closer yet still too far

C-2 set out to close key gaps, but C-12 has removed two of the more important elements. The newly proposed law does not contain a “lawful-access regime” allowing police and CSIS to compel basic subscriber information from internet or email service providers. It also sets aside expanded Canada Post inspection powers.

The lawful access changes attempted to bring Canada in line with its Five Eyes intelligence partners, all of whom have such regimes. It sought to do so while staying within limits set by the Supreme Court’s R v Spencer ruling, which struck down a police request in a child pornography case. The bill attempted to ensure proper statutory authority by allowing police to obtain limited, low-sensitivity disclosures when they have reasonable grounds to do so, or in exigent-circumstances—emergency situations demanding swift action. Any further action would still require a warrant.

The Canada Post aspect aimed to close a long-standing loophole that organized crime and drug traffickers happily exploit. Canada Post inspectors can already open parcels but not letters—a vulnerability for small-parcel drug and cash smuggling. C-2 allowed inspection where of letters when there are reasonable grounds to suspect non-mailable matter, and police searches only under warrant. This would fill a gap in postal powers, and be aligned with other regulated-industry inspectors that have limited warrantless access powers governed by reasonable ground standards. This includes border service agents, FINTRAC inspectors, CRA auditors, and inspectors granted powers under the Canadian Environmental Protection and Transportation of Dangerous Goods Acts. These are administrative—not criminal—searches, authorized only where a statute sets an objective and defensible basis for actions.

No major ‘warrantless powers’

Contrary to alarmist claims, C-2 introduced no major “warrantless powers.” Instead, it sought to provide the narrow ability to request basic identifying information, subject to the same evidentiary thresholds and tests that govern other investigative tools—with follow-up powers conditional upon obtaining a production order or warrant.

These would be constrained by the same type of “reasonable grounds” framework that governs similar police access scenarios. The concept is well-established: the reasonable grounds must be supported by articulable facts, not just subjective beliefs or hunches. Police must have some reason to suspect a crime has taken place, or someone is in possession of a firearm or a drug. Under C-2, that would remain the case with the powers to make information demands contemplated by the bill. With the advent of body camera technology, and every click easily monitored online, the risk of police power abuse has never been lower.

Canada’s privacy threshold for even basic identifiers is among the developed world’s strictest. Comparable democracies like the US, UK, Australia and EU states allow limited administrative or subpoena-based access without full judicial warrants for types of basic identifying information under reasonable grounds. C-2 merely would have brought Canada more in line with that mainstream, treating minimal-risk data requests as what they should be: low sensitivity, routine tools for 21^st-century law enforcement.

C-12 bucks immigration criticisms

C-2 also faced excessive concern over its asylum and immigration measures. Thankfully these remains in place in C-12, despite predictable criticism from migrant and human rights groups.

C-12 would place a one-year time limit on asylum claims to prevent people entering on other grounds from later invoking asylum to stay. It would create ministerial ‘public interest’ powers to cancel, suspend, or modify immigration documents when warranted, avoiding the backlog that can occur from threats, abuses of process, and stalled deportations. It would also allow Ottawa to pause new applications or suspend processing–empowering the government with basic controls to manage overloads in circumstances to be prescribed by regulation. Here, Canada also lags its partners. Australia (in section 501 of its Migration Act) and New Zealand already have public interest powers, and the United Kingdom has the ability/duty to remove individuals who enter under irregular entry circumstances and or stay beyond prescribed timeframes. Whether they’re doing that in practice, in line with the wishes of the public, is another question, but they at least have some powers on the books to do so.

The United States has a one-year limit on asylum as well. We would be wise to adopt the sensible reforms our southern neighbours enact—while rejecting others—to align key elements of our border management systems.

The backlash in Canada to C-2’s straightforward immigration measures that allow the government to exert basic control—over a system that has faltered and lost the public confidence—shows how far public discourse has drifted from reality.

The problem is behind our border

Our public safety complacency has created a structural weakness. Landmark cases like R v Spencer and R v Tse curtailed emergency data access and wiretaps. Cases involving cross-border crime too often collapse under the Jordan ceiling which sets limits on criminal trail wait times, or falter because of procedural disclosure rules under Stinchcombe. We need targeted statutory carve-outs for organized-crime and national-security cases—protecting due process while giving investigators and prosecutors tools that match the crime environment they face.

Losing the plot and missing a chance at renewed credibility

Canada needs to reframe the narrative: the trade-off is not between security and liberty, but weakness and deterrence. Bill C-2’s changes were overdue, and just a start. Now, Bill C-12’s rollback is a retreat—one that betrays how disconnected public discourse is from the threat environment.

The United States has taken notice, as have our allies. They already have many of these powers in place and increasingly look upon Canada as a naïve and unreliable partner. To look credible, we must match intent with capacity. A secure, well-governed border is not a retreat from openness; it’s the foundation for trust, prosperity, and genuine freedom.

Peter Copeland is deputy director of domestic policy at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute.